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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

ROBERT DENNIS EAGLE,

Case No. 16189

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELL\NT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of
T~eft.

a Class

§~6-6-404

A ~lis demeanor.

in violation of Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court

:nand for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant
H

Croft. Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, ROBERT DE:-JNIS EAGLE, was charged by

:::for:nation ·..;ith the offense of Theft. a Class
·~alation

A

Hisdemeanor in

of Ctah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

---. .:: Ja:: ): ..:..ug•.1st, 1973. :1e

appel~ant

On the

·.;as conv:.c:ed ':ly a jury
On the 22nd day
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant. ROBERT

DE~l!HS

EAGLE. seeks reversal of

the judgment of guilt entered against him and a new trial in
the above entitled matter.
STATEME~IT

Two

OF THE FACTS

••ere called at the trial, both '"'ere el'lployees

·o~itnesses

of Z.C.H.I. Corporation. a retail store in Salt Lake County.
Clarence Duwavne P::-ice. a

securi~y

operative at Z.C.:1.I. was

calle~

to the stand and testified that on the 25th day of May, 1978, at
approximately 6 00 ?
the

Z.C.~.

I

he saw the appellant and one Myles in

~.

store :ocated on

~ain

Street and South Temple.

witness' attention was iirec:ed :o :he two
?roceeded :c an 1rea in the

~en's

tesci:ied that he noticed the :wo

suit
~en

i~dividuals

depart~ent

as they
'"'itness

:~e

and recalled :he

The

:i~e

as

:he >tore

~C'
·~

••

'.

~

--

-

--

-~.)

s:_- __

~

- - . '~

P-
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shoulder, walked along an area in Z.C.M.I. where they passed a
number of cash registers, through a short passageway into the
sporting goods department, where they proceeded by another cash
register.

They then went on to the main aisle becween the

sporting goods department, headed west into the book department
and then proceeded generally in the direction of the north exit
door (Tr. 13, 14).
:1vles, he saw
~ost

As the witness followed the appellant and

ther:~

go around the sporting goods counter and then

sight of them.

As he continued to follow them, he noticed

rwo men's suits lying on the floor of the store (Tr. 17).
~yles

and the appellant approached him,

t~e

As

witness testified

:~at

he showed them his Z.C.X.I. identification and told them

:~at

they were under arrest (Tr. 18).

The

appellant then told

?rice that they had done nothing wrong and they were leaving the
store without any merchandise.
:'-;~es

.:c

At that point, the appellant and

attempted to push past the ,..,itness, who grabbed the appellant

a bear hug (Tr.

~8).

Then the appellant told :lyles to run.

''<es followed t;,.e appellant's advice, but was subsequently stopped
~-;

:·...-o other

:.c.~.:::

clerks outside of the store and voluntarily
~r

J~~e::~~:

did

~ot

have

t~e

3Uits

Price further testified that the
~ith

hio when he was stopped and
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register in the store (Tr. 22).
The prosecution also called Mr. Van Thomas Whitesides,
who testified, based upon business records, to the value of the

men's suits found on the floor of the sporting goods departcent.

The testimony of Mr. Whitesides was uncontradicted and certain
exhibits which were entered into evidence without objection by
the appellant (Tr. 30 .31).

7he defense rested without appellant

producing any evidence or taking the stand in his own defense
(Tr. 32).
Appellant

~oved

to dismiss the Information at the end of

all evidence, arguing that at best the State had shown an attempt
to commit a thef:. which would have reduced the offense to a Class
B

:he mot:on to dismiss was denied (Tr. 33-40).

~isdemeanor

Counsel also requested a directed verdict pursuant to instructions
submitted to the Court, which was also denied (Tr.
Proposed Instruction

~o.

~5).

Appellant'i

ll stated

You are ~nstr'...:.cced to find :t-.e ae:endant, ROBERT·
JENNIS SAGLE. not ;;u:lt'l o: :he offense of 1heft
as chaqed ~:: :~e b:omation. (R .... 2)
.-\ :1umber of tJroposed :ns:r·..:ct:cns . ..,ere of:ered
were ref'...:.sed

~v

~:'

the de:ense.

·.,;h~~~

:he Cour'::.

_:::.- -... 3 .. .3

.:) -....:..::- -
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Ap!Jellant further excepted the Court's failure to give an inatruction on what is commonly referred to as reasonable alternative hy?Othesis (Tr. 44, Appellant's Proposed Instruction No. 6):
To warrant you in convicting the defendant
of the crime charged in the Information, or
of any crime included therein, the evidence
must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
defendant; that is to say, if after a full
and fair consideration and comparison of
all the testimony in the case you can reasonably explain the facts in evidence on any
reasonable ground other than the guilt of
the defendant, then you must find him not
guilty. (R. 37)
~e
·2

~rosecution,

through the Deputy County Attorney, also excepted

the Court's failure to give that particular instruction as re-

:·Jested ITr. 45-4 7).
The appellant excepted to the Court's failure to give
nooosed Instruction No. 7, concerni;1g the requirement of joint
:oecation of act and intent (Tr. 44):
You are instructed that in everv crime or public offense there must be a union or joint
operation of the act and intent. 7he intent
or intention is manifested by the circumstances
connected ~ith the offense and the sound mind
and discretion of the accused.
All oresumotior.s of law, independent of evidence.
are in favor of innocence. and a ~an is innocent
until he is craved ~uilcv bevond a reasonable
~oubt.
And ln case~of a· cea~onable doubt as
____ ·..:r.ec~e:- :--,:._:; ::;t.:.:..:: :.s sa~::..s:ac:Jril:; s~own,
~e

:._3

ent:.c~ed

':oar:

ac~·.l::_':f_:al

1 R.

38)
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purswant to t:tah Code Ann. §76-2-307 (1953 as aoended).

The Court

failed to give said instruction and the appellant took proper exception thereto (Tr. at

46) (R.

46).

During closing arguments, counsel for the State 1:1ade
reference to the fact that the appellant did not take the stand
or adduce evidence.

Counsel for the appellant made proper objec-

tion to that

and such

co~ent

Court at one ?Oint and

~;,e

On

these

~cis~s

~ot~ons

J:

:::--.ese

~ere

t~en

~pon

:-e!:.a:.-~.s.

~en:ed

:R

objec:~on

:~r:her

a:;?e~~an::

~s.

was overruled by the
objection, the Court

~cved

::J;: rt

mistrial.

:~9-192)

7HE JE:!::;JA:~:- :;~ .4. ·.:~:>!:!:.:L.l.l.. C.-\:3E :S s:r:"I7LE~ -:-0
nA':E ::1E ..:·~·'<-:· :::s::<.~r:-:::J =:; ei:S -=-:'iEO::Z':' JF :HE
:.\SE . ~~~;) ::-.:..::...~·?..::: -:-r::· SC :::s:::\:.:c-:- :s ?.E':E:?-.S :3:...E
El-l:lJ?,

....

L' •_

l ' t' :~
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Jpportunity to pay for the goods, and as they approached Mr. Price,
:he security operative, that they were not in possession of the
~en's

suits as those suits had been left near the sporting goods

Jepartment of the store.

Taking the State's evidence at its best

:he anly inference that can be drawn is that the men changed their
~:nds

and withdrew voluntarily

from the criminal activity.

Counsel

:Jr appellant requested the following instruction as Appellant's
"~·loosed

Supplemental Instruction

~o.

3·

You are instructed that it is an affirmative
defense to a orosecutio~ in which an actor'3
criminal responsibility arises fro~ his own
conduct or from being a party :o an offense
that prior to the commission of the offense
the actor voluntaril'l terminated his effor:
to promote or facilitate its commissio~ and
either
~) Gave timely warning to the oroper law enforecment authorities or the intended victim,
or

2) r.·.lholly deprives hi.s ?rior

e:~orts

of e::ec-

ti·:eness in the connissi.on.
If

~ou

find from the evidence that :he defendant,
EAGLE. wholly deprl'led his prior
efforts in the commission of the of:ense of
:heft of an'/ er:ectivenesS, :!len 'IOU :nust :':i.:1d
hi:-:1 r10t ;;u(lc:' of that: charge.
IR. 46)
~OB~R7 J.
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Code Ann.

§"6-2-307

(~953

This statute is found in

as amended).

our criminal code within the part on defenses to criminal responsibility.

At the time of

t~e

t~is

enactment of the new code,
sche~e.

was new to Utah's statutory

2

However, the "renunciation"

defense has long been established as valid at common law.

at 737
pri~arv

Dix and Sharlot, Criminal Law (1973)

~9o.2).

The legislati•:e ?urpose of

c~ain

t~is

objective of :he crimina: law.

It is desirable to provide an
a

of

cr~rnina:

steps to stop the

::: _.. ,

e~ents

crirn~na:

-

: ' : : c f'l. s e --_:

~s

LaFave

A.L.l. Xodel Penal

and Scott. Criminal Law (1972) §75 at 519-20.
Code. §206(6) (P 0 ::>.

defense

wh~ch

~nducement

~nto

defense
~s

~s

to follow the

to prevent crime

:o those who have set

action to a:low them to take

ac:ivi:v and ultirnate:v prevent the

~~

~:::~~a:-·:e

.

~~:ens~

::

~
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cheir activity to promote the commission of the theft of the suits
~y

leaving them on the owner's premises and (2) wholly deprived

~heir

prior efforts at theft of any effectiveness by dispossessing

themselves of any dominion or control over the suits.

This was

established in the testimony of Mr. Price both in his description

Ji the appellant's and Myles' acts and his testimony about the
statement made by the appellant when he said that they were leaving
:~e

store without any merchandise (Tr. 18).
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that an
in a criminal action !"las a rig!"lt to submit to the jury

j·:_J~ea

·::; t!"leory of the case, and that such theory vlhen properl:: requested
,~.culd

be given to the jury in the form of written instr-.1c:::ms

5t.ne v. Stenbeck. 73 IJtah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

In State v.

-cnnson. 112 !Jtah l30, 185 P. 2d 738 (1937). this Court stated the
;~olicable

standard in determining when such an instruction must

· e :::. ven

It ~s admitted chat the defendant is entit~ed
co 'lave t:!le jury instructed on !lis theory
of t!le case if there is anv substantial
evidence co justifv giving suc!l an instr-.1ct:ion.
'135 p 2d 238'
~ere

; .:.3-44)

·..:as substantial e•:idence to support: :he c!"leory
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(b) ~ith the purpose to deprive him of that
property 3
The l'tah Cr i.::Ji.nal Cude deLnes the '..lord "obtain" as
bringinj! about a tr.1nsfer of oossession

.:.

The Code defines "pur-

pose to deprive" as "having the conscious object to withhold
property per:nanentl? or ::or so extended a per"i.od such that a subval~e

stantial portion o:: its econocic
of would be

~ost.

::~e

ur to :-estore

~s

~v:es

?ropert::

onl:-~

..lpon ?aynent of

1

5

a reward ur ether comper.sati.)n"

appell3nt anJ

or the use or benefit there-

~~ear

i~

:~e

respect

t~at

ever ubtained or exercised unauthorized centro:

over the proper:v
of the

~ec;uis

::0 ec0nur.-:i..:

i. :e

~·~r:Jose

::..~:.:-:1,..;.::...Jr.

.....

:o :Je:-::Janentl:: deori·;e the o•.mer of the

'.'3~·J.e.

:;or ·. .:as ::-:.::..s d -.:ase •..;here

See :;e
~::-

:':L' •

:~e

::-:.J.~

,";:;c::s eC

,L':->
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plan or scheme when the property was left on the premises.

~~~minal

Y~nce.
er~or

the defense instruction was properly requested and it was
to fail to submit that defense to the jury.
The instant case is distinp,uishable from the recent decision

,f this Court in State v. Smith. Utah, 571 P.2d 578 (1977). wherein

same issue was raised.

=~~

~nstant

:~e

In State v. Smith. supra, unlike the

case. there was an actual conversion of real property by

defendant and a transfer of title from the victim to the defen-

:ant then to a third person and then the realty was encumbered by
:nc1

o

·gage in the name of the third person

In short, the theft

-. chat case was actually consummated by the transfer of the
~r:>Dert?
.~.

·:alue substantially by the mortgage.
:ransfer or diminution occurred.

-~ch

-~

to the third person and furthermore, the real::' dir::inished

c~e

Ir.

t~e

i~stant

~ase

~c

:he merchandise was left

store at a point where cash registers were still available

... ::Ja·rment to be made.
In deter.<i:-ti.f'g ·.;h-:ther a failure ':o gi.·,;e a requested
.c.s:rucci.0n i.s prejudicial the question is "if the
.-~·~::i..Jn

"~~

~s

~equested

i.n-

had ':Jeen gi.·.ren and t'-le j•Jr:' had so cor.si.dered :'-le evidence,
a reasonable li.~eli.~ood chac ~= mav have had some ef!ect

·.·e :- i.:.....:: ~enJ.e::-ed".
-=-··.(_~

·:e;:·:

State ··

;~: ::ci-'.esc:-..

::-::':'o:-':ant ~a.c':s

:.:-1

:~~s

L'ta;,.

560 ? 2C

:a.:ie ·..;e:-e

:~a:

.e
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out the instruction on the defense of voluntary termination these
facts become insignificant.

So it is reasonably likely that had

the instruction been given such facts would have weighed heavily
in the jury's deliberations and a verdict of not guilty may have
been returned.
The Court's !ailure to give

t~e

prejudicial because it also prevented the
his defense.

requested
ao~ellant

~nstrJction

was

from presenting

In State v. Papoas. \.:tah, 588 P 2d 175 (1973) this

Court ruled that there was prejudicial error with respect to the
failure to instruct on the de:ense of entrapment
~hen there ~3 anv evidence which could
reasonaDc'/ je cegardecr-as indicating er.traprnent, the ~uestiun ·.;hether ~t is sufficient
to raise a 'reasonable doubt that the defendant
wou~d have ~c~itted :he cri~e. except for the
~nducement bv the ~alice officer is for the
~ur:1 :o deter::1:.:1e
sss P 2d :~s. l -s-~~- :Emphas~s Supplied]
·.~'hen

there

~s

anv ev:i..jence o: a defense ':he ?rejud:.c:e arising ::-orr,

_:_--_-t"
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~rfectiveness

in the commission of the offense of theft.

The

case must be remanded to the District Court for a new trial in
·.o~hich

the appellant will be allowed to raise the defense of volun-

tary termination pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-2-307 (1953 aa
a!'lended).

POINT II
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 10 ALLOWING THE
JURY TO INFER THE r:nENT TO COMMIT A THEFT L'NCONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO INFER THE
CRUICIAL ELE!-!ENT OF INTENT.
Over proper exception by counsel for appellant, the Court
'::ered the following statement to the jury as part of

::o

~0

(Tr.

6.3-44) (R.

Ir.str~ction

57):

. A person's state of mind is not always
susceptible of proof be direct and positive
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be inferred
from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances.
T~e
iJ~~e

.:

~nstruction

:~e

-~:~e

issue at trial was the intent of appellant and the
allowed the jury to infer this cruicial element

offense in effect diminishing the burden on the State to
each and everv
::-,~s
~~

ele~ent

beyond a reasonable doubt.

c:rpe of inscruction has recent::r been held to be

~~e

process of law under :he Fourteenth
:~

Sands:ro~

.,

A~endoent

to

~ontana,
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in the instant case relieve the State of its constitutional burden
to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt by
permitting an unwarranted inference of a cruicial element of the
offense, the mens rea or intent.
In the case before the Court since the entire issue
centered around the intent of the appellant, the inference allowed
the jurors in Instriction :-lo. lO "conflict[ed) with the overriding
presumption of innocence

~ith

which the law endows the accused

and which extends to everv elecent of the crir:1e"

Sandstrom

v. :-lontana, supra, 25 Cr L. at 3163.
L'nder circucstances of the instant case the Court's
tion No. 10 denied appel:ant due ?rocess of law under the
Amendment to the

~ni:ed

Fourteen~~

Sta:es Cons:itution and Article I, Section

7 of :he Constitution of :he State of Ctah.

POI:-lT III
:-HE :-~IA:. :rJL"~-:''5
?~OPOSD

InstrC~c-

?.;::.:.:!U: cO :;r.'E -\?PE:.:.A;r:··s
J:; RESO~AB:.E _;;_:E:R.:lA":'I':E

:~<S;"R~C":":J~

'lY!'OT:-1ESlS ·;;..s '\E'."ERS:3;_;:: ::::!\...RC?..

~--,,....,,,...,_

_e _e .. ·--

~-

•1.
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eration and comparison of all the testimony in
the case you can reasonably explain the facts
in evidence on any reasonable ground other than
the guilt of the defendant, then you must find
him not guilty. (R. 162)
The instruction as stated was a proper statement of th•
~aw

as defined in the seminal case of State v. Crawford, 59 Utah

39' 201 p. 2d 1030 (1921).

Numerous cases have discussed the failure of the trial
court to give this instruction, and the rule seems clearly stated
:~at

It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that
the giving of such an instruction [reasonable
alternative hypothesis] is neither appropriate
nor required unless proof of a material issue is
based solely upon circumstantial evidence.
State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1979;
citing to State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 138'
(1977) and State v. Garcia, 11 utah 2d 67, 335
P 2d 57 (1960).
(Emphasis Supplied)
In the instant case the material issue of intent to per~dnentl?
J.

:

deprive

~ rcums

e~ement

Z.C.~.I.

of the property was clearly based solely

tan t ia l evidence.

There '.Yas no direct evidence of this

of the crime of theft.

:1oreover, the property having been

;:andoned, the elements of obtaining or exercising unauthorized
-·~:~~l ~ere

--= 3:ore

totallv circumstantial since the appellant never left

~~th

che

sui~s

~ ~'

and indicated his lack of intent or

::e State

•Jt

;__::a" :onceeced :he ;::.rcumscantial
'Ple
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Attorney. Hr. Yengich, defense counsel and the Court reflects this
acquiescence:
MR. HOUSLEY: Your Honor, I am in agreement with
defense counsel. He is entitled to an Instruction
concerning reasonable alternative hypot~esis and
I didn't request it.
If he requests it, he is
entitled to it.
THE COURT:
I was just going to make a cocment in
the record for that. You both have indicated that.
The Supreme Court has ruled in more than one case
that that instruction is proper only where the
evidence is all circumstantial. '..fuere we have
evidence here that is direct and positive. eyewitness testimony of two guys taking a suit,
wrapping it in an overcoat, throwing it over their
shoulder, starting to •.-alk out the store, that is
not circumstantial evidence.
I don't think under
the facts and circumstances of this case the reasonble hypothesis instruction is proper, in any sense
of the word. under the Supreme Court decision.
Hith respect to :<.on's [~lr. Yengich's] comment
about state of mind. I t~ink that were the statute
itself expressly sets for the state of mind required as one of the essential elements of the
crime. :hat we define that as one of the elements
and state what the law is with respect to that
state of mind. and that is all ·.-e need do in preparing these instruc:~ons. [7he Cour:'s and
defense counsel's discussion on a different instruction omitted]
'~.

YE~GICH

speaking on
I ~auld as~
:hat :a...::~
~'R

\' . '~=.

HOL'S:..E:·
!-to nor-.

And ~inal:~. ~r Hous:ev was
:~e reasonab:e a::ere'.at~·:e :"l::pot~es~s
~~ ·1ou ~ave any:~~~g ~:se :~ sa~· on
ion·: sa:: ·. :r.a.::

sa:..c..
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ever, I feel it is necessary for me to advise
the Court, if I think the Court is permitting
error to enter the record, and it seems to me
in this case it is because of the fact that we
have to rely on circumstantial evidence to show
the state of their minds, and in view of that,
that being a necessary element, as I read the
same cases as your Honor referred to, that
requires a reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction to cover their state of mind or
the possible other alternative with their
state of mind.
THE COURT:

It is where the evidence of the
crime is all circumstantial, as I understand
that case, that instruction is proper and at no
other time. Let me say this, fellows.
I do
the best I can in framing my instructions as
I think they ought to be.
You fellows don't
need to apologize to me for taking exceptions
to the ins true t ions I give. That is the purpose of our ~eeting, and you are welcome to
state any exceptions you want.
If there is
merit to it, I will correct my instructions.
But if I don't agree with your exceptions,
you are welcome to take them and I just
simply have to take my chances with the court
on high. 'P1at is the way I see it.
(Tr. 45-47)
The County Attorney's candid admission that the giving
,- che instruction is appropriate and the failure to do so is telling,
'aK:~g

~he

;o•:i.ous
;:~en

error with respect to the failure to give this instruction
Prejudice arises "if the requested instruction had been

had so considered the evidence, there is a reasonable likeli-

'cC ::cat it ma:r "lave had some effect on the verdict rendered"

Yi:cheson.

suc~a

Here the appellant had abandoned :he
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not formed the requisite intent.

That being an alternative hy-

pothesis to be inferred from the two separate acts the jury may
have returned a different verdict-one of not guilty, or

att~ted

theft.

On this basis, the judgment rendered in the District Court

must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
POINT

:v

IN CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BY COMMENTING ON THE APPELLANT'S FAILING TO
TESTIFY AND TliiS MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE
TO THE APPELLANT.
In the course of the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's
argUI:Ient to t:he jur:'. the prosecutor made t:he following remarks·

[BY MR. HOUSLEY]
. The third t:hing counsel
stat:ed was t:hat t:he defendant did not t:ake the
st:and. He t:hen stated-YENGICH: I am going to object: to any reference
for the defendant: not t:aking the stand. Instruct:ion
No. 6 stat:es it: is his right. It: is improper for
counsel t:o comment: upon it:.

~R.

MR. HOUSLEY
Your Honor. I request an:' ar"ument:made to the Court be out of the hearing of~the
jurv.

THE COURT
~io. I don't know- how far ::ou are going
to go. I suggest :o you that you li~it ::our co~
ments
He has dealt at sor.e ~ength about that
and I ~i:: :et ~ou resco~d ~n some ~a~
Ycu ~now
~hat the li~~=a~ions a~e and don't go be::ond :hat.
:!R
~ent

YE:iGICH
at a::

L
~~-a~o~: ~t

:a~e

~x2ep:~on

,

:2

-~::.-:::

~~s

s:are-

-·-:as
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stand because he could add nothing to what had
already been presented. He could have added
that he--the reason why he did not go to the
first cash register over in that department.
MR. YENGICH: I will object, your Honor. It
is improper argument on what could have been
added. I commented solely on the Court's
Instruction No. 6 and not what could have
been said by the defendant.
THE COURT:
Housley.

Let's not go into that, Mr.

MR. YENGICH: I have a motion on that basis,
if the Court will allow me to reserve it.
THE COURT:
MR. HOUSLEY:
THE COURT:
done.

Go ahead.
He could have-Don't go into what he could have

MR. HOUSLEY: All right. The evidence in this
case shows uncontroverted by any other evidence
that-MR. YENGICH: Same objection.
put on evidence.

Defendant did not

THE COUR7: Well, objection to that last comment
is overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Housley.
Defense counsel's motion for a mistrial was subsequently
~enied.
~e

~as

The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed
responding to was:
Now, the issue. I want to caution you about
a few things before we get to what facts I think
comport with that view of the law and that view
of the evidence. The issue isn't this :;oung oan
cid :1ot take t~e stand anc tes t~f:"·;
The Court has
~nstructed ~ou in th~s Instructio~ ~o. 6 about
that.
I ca~tion d ~ou at :~e ouset, as I told
::ou
I caution ou. at :his ti~e, as I told :;ou at

-=~e ,:_'ll_:_:=:;et. ::-:.1r:
s :"""':',· .-::ec:..s:.or. as ::is a:tor:;e:t.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

~

1 -

I determined that one the basis of the evidence
that was adduced, there was no need for Mr.
Eagle to testify and I was happy with the
evidence for your ultimate resolution as to
whether or not this is an attempted theft,
a theft or no theft at all. I suggest to
you Hr. Eagle could have added nothing to
that.
Although counsel for the appellant did comment on the
fact that the appellant had not
the bounds of the law.

tak~n

the stand, he did so within

He merely mentioned that the appellant had

not taken the witness stand, that the Court had instructed them on
the inference to be drawn and that it was counsel's decision to
allow the evidence to stand.
were clearl:r

co~~~nents

The prosecutor's comments however,

intended to cause the jury to draw adverse

conclusions as to why the appellant did not testify.

It '.Yas an

unfavorable comment on the appellant's exercise of his Fifth Amend~ent

privilege against self-incrimination.
In Griffin v. Califon1ia. 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme

Court held that it
?rivilege against

~s

a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment

self-~ncr:rnination

to

al~ow

co!!I!Ilent on an accused's :ai.lure :o :esc::..£::.

a prosecutor to
The reasons that the

Court gave for this hol.ding ·,.;ere :hat such a cor:unenc, if a:.:owed
b~:

t~e

cour:s.

~ecornes

t~~

equivalent of an

of~er

of 2videnc2.
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~=

··~
ercising his Fifth Amendment privilege.
In State v. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114 (1977), this Couct
found that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not presented any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendaant
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah.

~ith

respect to a prosecu-

tor's closing argument, the Court commented:
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege
of analyzing the whole evidence as a general
proposition. However, there is a point beyond
which it must not go in regard to the defendant's
constitutional right just referred to; and this
includes that it should not be impaired or
destroyed by making comments on the failure
of the defendant to take the witness stand.
569 P.2d at 1116
The Court went on to distinguish the case of State v.
i<azda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975).

In State v. Kazda, supra, the

Court found that the prosecutor has a prerogative and a duty to
argue all aspects of the case so long as there is no direct reference
:o the failure to testify.

The Court then recognized that:

Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it
was but a thinly disguised attempt to do indirectly what the prosecutor knew could not
properly be done directly; that is, to comment
on the fact that the defendant had chosen not
to take the witness stand, and to persuade the
jury to draw inferences as to his guilt because
of his exercise of that constitutional privilege.
::ootnote omitted] ;69 P 2d at 1~:6
=n Su.:e ··

3oone. ·:cah, 53: P 2d

s;:

(~979),

:his Court
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he did not have his defendant testify because the prosecutor was
a skilled cross-examiner.

On rebuttal the prosecutor emphasized

this statement in noting that the defendant had not testified.
This Court found that "the prosecutor was simply emphasizing
one of the reasons suggested by defense counsel as to why the
defendant did not take the stand".
situation in the case at bar is

581 P.2d 571, 574.

subst~ntially

situation in State v. Boone, supra.

The

different than the

Here defense counsel drew

the jury's attention to the instruction on the failure of the
appellant to testify. then stated that there •.Yas no need for the
appellant to testify in light of the state of the evidence (T. 8-9)
In response, the prosecutor argued that the appellant could have
given reasons why the appellant did not initially stop at a cash
register and that the prosecution evidence was uncontroverted
(T. 19-20).

Obviously, describing the evidence that may be intro-

duced should the appellant testify goes much further than a proseC'..ltor co!r.!!'lentin/( on his own ability to cross-examine a '.Yitness
In other jurisdictions when a prosecutor has even

al~uded

to the possible :ontent of a defendant's :estimonv when chat
defendant has
In

~vers

v

fai.~ed

to test:if::. the cour::s have reversed

State. 5-J S ·.: 2d i9

!~ex

~'r5l.

convi-::~.c~.'

the prosecutor

a:-;·~ec
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on to state, "Thus if the remark complained of called attention to
the absence of evidence that only the testimony from the appellant
could supply, the conviction must be reversed".

573 S.W.2d 19, 21.

Likewise in Rachel v. Bordenkirdier, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir., 1978),
the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter in a state prosecution.

At trial, the prosecutor argued that there were no facts

in evidence about how the victim had been beaten or when he was
abducted because of all of the men who knew, some would not tell
and the other was dead.

On habeas corpus the Court of Appeals

reversed citing Griffin v. California, supra, because such remarks
c8nstituted a comment on the defendant's failure to testify.

Con-

,equently, the prosecutor's comments about the possible nature of
appellant's testimony in the case at bar constitute a comment

:~e

on the failure of the appellant to testify.
The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's
~efusal

to take the stand is a denial of his Fifth Amendment priv-

::ege against self- incrimination.

Griffin v. California, supra.

::·:en :hough the Court may instruct t!l.e jury to disregard the comment,
.:

st~ll

~as

~een

."ss:~le
___ j

.• -

1~

has been presented to the jury and the juror's attention
directed to it.

Psychologically, it would be nearly im-

for a juror to disregard such a remark
be

c~red

errcr

~s

Consequently,

neit!l.er bv a retraction nor by ac instruction,
subjec: :o

rev~e~

bv

t~is

Cour: even

~f

there was
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is harmless or prejudicial was given in State v. Eaton, supra,
where the Court stated:
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings
and the protections accorded those accused of crime
under our law, including the presumption of innocence and the burden of the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we
believe that, on appeal, when there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was
prejudicial, that doubt should '::le resolved in
favor of the defendant. This is especially true
where the error involved is one which transgresses
against the exercise of a constitutional right.
Consequently, the rule which we have numerous
times stated is that if the error is such as to
justify a belief that it ,ad a substantial adverse
effect upon the defendant's right to a fair trial,
in that there is a reasonable likelihood that in
its absence there may have been a different result,
then the error should not be regarded as harmless;
and converselv, if the error is such that it is
clear bevond ~ reasonable doubt that it was harmless in that the result would have been the same,
then the error should not be deemed prejudicial
and warrant granting a new trial.
[footnotes comitted] 569 P.2d at lll6 (1977)
Since the appellant was the only person who could have
explained whv he did not stop at the first available checks:and
the prosecutor's argument clearl:: implied that there ·..;as no reasor.ao:e explanation of

s~ch

conduc:

It is reasonably likelv that

such an argument :1ot ::,een :nacie. then ::he jur:: :nav have reached a
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POINT V
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
OFFENSE OF THEFT.
The evidence produced at trial was totally insufficient
to sustain a conviction for the offense of theft pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

That statute requires

:he State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
obtained or exercised unuathorized control over the property of
another with the purpose to deprive him thereof.

At best the

State established the offense of attempted theft.

Utah Code

Ann

§76-4-101(1) defines attempt:
For purposes of this part a person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense,
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
When the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction is

~~allenged
~Jon

on appeal this Court has stated "it must appear that

so viewing the evidence reasonable minds must necessarily

on:ertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
State v
3~e ~hen

·,;;=na~~e

Wilson, Utah, 565 P 2d 66 (1977).

In the instant

viewing the evidence rnost favorably to the State, no
?erson could disagree that there is a reasonable doubt

,- :oe ~:':JelLm: co!IT.1i:ted an:rthir.g :nore :har. attempted theft

In :he case of ?ecole v

~a:Rares.

23 I~l App 3d 72, 328
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N.E.2d 210 (1975), the defendant was charged and convicted of
attempted theft and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal.
bar.

The facts were very similar to those in the case at

In that case the defendant had placed a shirt and a package

of underwear in a paper bag.

He walked past a cash register

and into another department of the store.

He was stopped by a

store detective with the merchandise in his possession and arrested.
The Appellate Court found that the evidence was sufficient to
establish conduct constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft.

The Court stated:

The substantial steo was taken when the defendant
placed the ~erchandise in his bag, and passed
a checkout counter into another department.
Although these acts required to complete the
substantive offense of theft. thev constitute
more than ~ere preparation and reach for
enough toward the accomplishment of the desired
result.
328 ~.E.2d 210,211.
In the instant case the facts are even weaker than in
People v. Falgares. surpa.
a suit under his overcoat,
an 3rea

stil~

Here the appellant was seen putting
wa~~ing

past one checkout counter into

wi:hin the store where other checkout counters

were still available to pay for :he merchandise.
aopellant

·..~as

accosted bv che secur:'.::: J::'::':'..:er he
.
. .
.
the merchandi.se :~
~:s
?ossess:on.

.

.

'P.'.en ·..;hen the
:10

longer had

.

:..:'1a~:::..1::.or.
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of the suit under the coat would evidence the necessary intent
or purpose to deprive and walking past the first checkout counter
could conceivably constitute a substantial step towards the commission of the offense of theft.

However, because the appellant

was still in the store and it was customary to pay for merchandise
from one department at the checkout counter in another part of
the store, no reasonable person could differ in finding that no
mauthorized control had been exercised over the merchandise.
POINT VI
THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL \lAS DENIED
BY THE CUMULATIVE ERROR COM?1ITTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

Each of the errors in the preceeding points constitutes
~rejudicial

error that would require a reversal of the judgment

Jf the court below.

But these errors must also be considered

:o have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial.
~ven

if the individual errors are not ?rejudicial in and of them-

ie~·:es

chis Court should determine that appellant's case was

~~eoarabl;:
7c~~rs

prejudicial by the cumulative effect of the numerous

at trial and hence reverse and remand the case for a new
S:a:e ·;.St. Clair, 3 L:tah 2d.230.232 P 2d 323 rl955).
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfullv submits t~at ~he ~ndi.vidual and
cumulative errors as stated ~erein. ret1ui.re reversal of the verdict
of the jury and :~e ~·..1dgment entered thereon. and the appellant

should be granted a new :rial in the Third Judi.cial Distri.ct
Court.
DATED

:~~s

da'' vf Au['.JSt. 19"9.
Respectfull~

subnitted,

RONALJ J. YE:IGICH
for Appellant
G FRED c1E-:'OS (Of Counsel)

Attor~ev
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